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Forecasting the Failed States Index with an Automated
Trader in a Combinatorial Market
Anamaria Berea, Charles R. Twardy and Daniel T. Maxwell
C4I Center of Excellence, George Mason University and KaDSci, LLC.

Introduction
Forecasting the risk of a failed state in the intermediate future is an important intelligence and
social question. Even the ability to anticipate state failure – let alone avoid it – could save
thousands of lives and hundreds of millions of dollars annually, just by prepositioning
humanitarian relief and security forces. Although state failure is a highly complex event, recent
high-profile projects like ICEWS revisit the goal of automated or semi-automated crisis
warning.1 Depending on who you talk to, this goal is either ludicrous or obvious.
It’s ludicrous because the world is complex, and most attempts have failed. Indeed, the 2010
Journal of Peace Research article of the year showed that the two most trusted models of civil
war were worthless:2
Large-n studies of conflict have produced a large number of statistically significant results but
little accurate guidance in terms of anticipating the onset of conflict.
It’s obvious because it has worked in other fields when models are actually developed for
prediction. The most famous discussion began in 1954 with Paul Meehl’s book, Clinical Versus
Statistical Prediction.3 In the ensuing seventy years, there have been hundreds of follow-on
studies. Two notable meta-analyses found that “mechanical” prediction was more accurate than
clinical prediction overall.4 In fact, much of the evidence suggests that the more complex the
situation, the stronger the advantage for models over experts.
In geopolitics, Tetlock’s Expert Political Judgment notably established that as far as forecasting
was concerned, there wasn’t much expert judgment to be had, and humans were often beaten by
embarrassingly simple statistical models (“no change”), and comprehensively beaten by
sophisticated models.5

1

Sean P. O’Brien, “Crisis Early Warning and Decision Support: Contemporary Approaches and Thoughts on Future
Research,” International Studies Review 12:1 (2010): 87–104.
2
“JPR Article of the Year Award, 2010, Goes to Michael D Ward, Brian D Greenhill & Kristin M Bakke,” Journal
of Peace Research 48:2 (March 1, 2011): 143–143; Michael D. Ward, Brian D. Greenhill, and Kristin M. Bakke,
“The Perils of Policy by P-value: Predicting Civil Conflicts,” Journal of Peace Research 47:4 (July 1, 2010): 363–
375.
3
Paul Everett Meehl, Clinical Versus Statistical Prediction: A Theoretical Analysis and a Review of the Evidence
(University of Minnesota Press, 1954).
4
Robyn Dawes, David Faust, and Paul Meehl, “Clinical Versus Actuarial Judgment,” Science 243:4899 (1989):
1668–74; M.C. Marchese, “Clinical Versus Actuarial Prediction: a Review of the Literature,” Perceptual and Motor
Skills 75:2 (October 1992): 583–94; William M. Grove et al., “Clinical Versus Mechanical Prediction: a MetaAnalysis,” Psychological Assessment 12:1 (2000): 19–30.
5
Philip Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know? (Princeton University Press,
2005).
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Our approach hypothesizes that a hybrid approach that integrates the judgment of experts with
”mechanical” prediction models can perform better than either individually. There is significant
evidence in other domains that supports this belief. Heckerman’s Pathfinder model6, now twenty
years old integrated expert judgment with a Bayesian Network for cancer diagnosis and
significantly outperformed experts, especially in the difficult cases.
The Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index is an example of an approach that integrates expert
judgment with models to assess the relative stability of countries.7 For our experiments we are
using the Failed States index score as a proxy for state stability by attempting to forecast the
score a country will receive when the annual results are released. To do this we create a Bayesian
network template containing the Failed States index variables, instantiate specific models for
several countries, and test it both alone and using estimates from a public prediction market.
This paper first discusses briefly the Failed States Model, and then describes a template Bayes
Net that can be used as a foundation for detailed modeling of specific countries and questions.
We then discuss a prototype model focused on Sudan for the year between June 2012 and June
2013 and describe an automated agent, called an autotrader that traded in the prediction market
alongside human users. The paper closes with a few conclusions and recommendations for future
research.

The Failed States Index – A Case Study in Structured Analysis
The Fund for Peace has developed a model it calls the “Conflict Assessment Tool” (CAST) that
summarizes “twelve conflict risk indicators to measure the condition of a state. The indicators
provide a snapshot in time than can be measured against other snapshots in a time series to
determine whether conditions are improving or worsening.”
The model applies content analysis techniques to thousands of open-source documents to derive
a score from 1-10 on each of the indicators, where 1 indicates stable and 10 indicates unstable.
The overall score for a country is the linear combination of the twelve scores. At the positive end
of the scale are countries like Canada with a 2012 score of 26.9. At the negative end of the scale,
are countries like the Congo with a score of 110 out of a possible 130. The score is published
annually in June. The score indicates a country’s stability relative to other countries, and by
extension provides a proxy for its risk of state failure. This approach is the current state of the
art.

6

David Heckerman, Probabilistic Similarity Networks. (MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 1991).
Fund for Peace (2012) The Fund for Peace Country Analysis Indicators and Their Measures, Publication CR-1097-CA (11-05C), available at: www.fundforpeace.org.
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Figure 1: Top level model template
template.

While the CAST approach is one of the most widely accepted and applied indicators of country
stability, it has a few key limitations that the use of other supplemental techniques could
ameliorate.
eliorate. Specifically, the Failed States Index is published annually. It would be valuable to
have earlier indications of instability. The linear combination of factors does not accommodate
some of the unique considerations associated with differing state maturity, geography, and
culture. Tailoring the component parts of CAST to each country should improve forecasting
performance. Finally, CAST is based on large quantities of open source information of varying
quality. It may be the case that there is classified
classified, proprietary information,, or expert judgment
available that is of higher quality one may wish to give additional weight. Therefore, we wish to
model explicitly the components of the CAST score.
We use Bayesian networks – Bay
Bayes nets or BNs for short. A Bayes net
et is a specialized
probability model that allows for analysts to combine their subjective beliefs about the likelihood
of events in the real world with evidence that is observed and collected over time. In addition to
thee ability to combine subjective judgment with evidence, Bayes netss have at least two other
strengths. First, they support rather complicated models with very efficient computational
algorithms. This allows analysts to represent explicitly many interacting factors, which is often
necessary in complex situations. Second, a Bayes net
et does not require all of the evidence to be
collected to start providing insights about changes in the likelihood of outcomes. As we shall see
later, this opportunistic updating makes BNs ideal for application in crowd-sourced
sourced forecasting
environments like prediction market
markets. There are several sumarizing publications in Bayes Nets
that describe the mechanism and the applications of this method.8 We patterned a Bayes net
template from the Fund for Peace CAST model. Error! Reference source not found.Figure
found.
1
9
shows
hows the top level of the model. It consists of a hypothesis node (about the FSI) associated
with the overall
verall index score and three nodes that aggregate indicators into the there major
categories of interest; social, economic, and political factors. For our purposes, the
he hypothesis
has three states: Improvement in state stability (Below Y), No significant Change
hange (Between Y
and X), and Deterioration
eterioration in stability (Above X). The specific values for each of these states,
8

Charniak, E.,, “Bayesian Networks Without T
Tears”, AI Magazine, Vol 12:4 (1991).
Figures are screenshots from a software tool called NETICA
NETICA, but many packages are available. See
http://www.cs.ubc.ca/~murphyk/Software/bnsoft.html or Appendix B of Kevin B. Korb and Ann E. Nicholson,
Bayesian Artificial Intelligence (CRC Press, 2003).
9
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depends on the specific country under consideration. The default values in the template model
place a higher likelihood on no change (80 percent) than a movement either up or down (10
percent each).
The three category nodes are similar to the hypothesis node, but slightly more detailed, to
accommodate evidence that has varying weight on the movement of the hypothesis. The “Up”
Figure 2: Social Indicators.

and “Down” states are each split into “Large” and “Moderate”. Once again, neutral is the most
likely, moving the likelihood of the hypothesis neither up nor down. By default, the moderate
states marginally increase the likelihood of movement in the hypothesis, and the large states
impact the movement of the hypothesis significantly. These default values are easily adjusted by
an analyst if they are inconsistent with the specific situation being modeled. Additionally, if an
analyst is more comfortable providing information differently, the structure of the model can be
modified to ease the elicitation burden by reversing arcs or modifying the nodes.
Each of the three category variables has a set of indicators underneath it that further align the BN
model with the CAST model. The CAST manual decomposes the primary indicators into a set of
measures that are associated with samples of relevant questions that would inform that indicator.
For example, the Social Factors category contains four indicators consisting of Demographic
Pressures, Sustained Human Flight, Refugees, and Group Grievance (Error! Reference source
not found.Figure 2) the logic of the conditional probabilities is similar to that described in
Error! Reference source not found.Figure 1 above. The other two category variables –
Economic Factors and Political Factors – are organized similar to Social Factors. The Economic
Factors include Uneven Development and Economic Decline, which in turn would have
measures like government debt, consumer confidence, and unemployment. Indicators for
Political Factors are State Legitimacy, Human Rights and Rule of Law, Factionalized Elites,
Public Service, Security Apparatus, and External Intervention. Measures include considerations
like corruption of government officials, level of violence, perception of elections, and makeup of
the government. Across the three categories there are a total of twelve indicators, with a much
broader collection of measures underneath them, not all of which are relevant to the situation
being considered by the analyst.
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Figure 3: Complete failed-state
state Bayes net temp
template.

Error! Reference source not found.
found.Figure 3 depicts the entire model, with all twelve indicators
integrated into one model. This complete model provides a template the analyst can tailor to the
specific country under consideration.

Country Case Study: Sudan
Our first case study is Sudan. For our prediction market, w
wee chose to focus on a psychologically
appealing threshold: “Will
Will Sudan score less than 100 in the 2013 Failed States Index?”.
Index? We
launched the question in mid-2012,
2012, after the 2012 score was released. At first the target seems
hopeless: Sudan scored a dismal 109.4 in 22012, and a nine point move is very rare: CAST scores
usually only move a couple of points per year, especially iin
n the positive, or down, direction.
However, Sudan split in 2012, with South Sudan getting the poorer regions. Sudan retained the
relatively wealthy north, albeit without access to the southern oil reserves. Will that enable it to
cross the threshold? As off April 2013, the answer is unknown, but our mod
model
el currently gives it
only an 8 percent chance. As noted in Figure 4, oour
ur prediction market has basically let that value
stand. How does the model arrive at the estimate?
Figure 4: DAGGRE Prediction Market Estimates
Estimates.

The DAGGRE prediction market estima
estimates
tes of the chance that Sudan will score less than
100 on the 2013 FSI (a substantial improvement). Now at 8% in early May,, the chances
have rarely exceeded 10%.
The first step in formulating the model is to adapt the hypothesis in the template to the specific
situation under consideration. In this case the template has three states, but the market question
only has two. Error! Reference source not found.
found.Figure 5 shows how the hypothesis template
t
42
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Figure 5: Sudan FSI Hypothesis Nodes
Nodes.

was instantiated and then mapped into a two-state hypothesis. First, we set our template states to
“Above 108”, “Between 100 and 108”, and “Below 100”. (A score of exactly 100 would resolve
in this case as above 100 or false
false.) Our initial judgment was that “Above 100” was nine times

more likely than “Below 100”. Breaking this down
down, we judged “Above 108” as 30 percent,
percent
“Between
ween 100 and 108” as 60 perc
percent, and “Below 100” as 10 percent.. We expected
improvement at roughly 7:3 odds, but thought nine points was unlikely. But our intuitive starting
judgments are of only passing interest. The real task was to identify drivers and indicators that
are relevant to the hypothesis and would be known before June 2013.
We need a small set of relevant, non
non-redundant indicators. In addition to parsimonious models,
we must be frugal with our limited forecaster time and points. Research
esearch on a question requires
time. Forecasting itself requires time, and conditional forecasting multiplies the number of
questions a forecaster must monitor.
To address the Sudan FSI question, we identified four factors in three categories and formulated
them into questions for the prediction
ction market
market. Specifically:
1. Will the Human Development Index for the Sudan for 2012 be: a) Less than 40, b)
Equal to 40 but less than 41.5 or c) Equal to or Greater than 41.5? (This score is
issued in November of each year by the UN)
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https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol6/iss5/6
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.6.3S.4

Berea et al.: Forecasting the Failed States Index with an Automated Trader

2. Will the UN High Com
Commissioner
missioner on Refugees report that more than 51,000 refugees
were repatriated to the Sudan in 2012? (This is issued each January by the UNHCR)
3. Will the UN High Commissioner on Refugees report that more than 501,000
refugees originated from the Sudan in 2012? (This is issued each January by the
UNHCR)
Figure 7: Fully Specified Sudan FSI Model
ll GDP Growth of Sudan exceed 0 percent in 2012 as published by the World
4. Will
Bank? (World Band Reports on this each February)
These questions are then integrated into the Bayes net model by associating them with a relevant
indicator. For example, the Human Development Index is evidence of Demographic pressure,
Figure 8: Finished Sudan FSI Model
either positive or negative depending on the direction it moves. Error! Reference source not

found.Figure 6 shows how the two nodes are related in the model and that the initial marginal
probability of the question is relatively evenly distributed among the outcomes. The “marginal”
“margin
probability is the unconditional probability. This is a consequence of constructing a conditional
probability table similar to the one
ones described for Error! Reference source not found.Figure
fou
2
and Error! Reference source not found.
found.Figure 5,, but associating improvements in the Human
Development Index with downward movement in the indicator node
node. (Recall that increasing FSI
indicates a deteriorating condition.) This process is repeated with the other three questions. The
two refugee questions are associated with Refugees and the GDP question is associated with
economic decline.
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Once the process of customizing the template is complete, we have constructed a twenty-one
twenty
node Bayesian network with almost 400 conditional probabilities, mostly derived from
relationships in the template and only five of which are directly relevan
relevantt to collecting market
judgments or providing a forecast relative to the hypothesis (See Error! Reference source not
found.Figure 7.) Fortunately, there are algorithmic operations that can reduce the model down to
a simpler model that is probabilistically equivalent that contains fewer nodes and is more suitable
for use by forecasters and analysts alike.
Error! Reference source not found.
found.Figure 8 depicts the equivalent model for the purpose of
forecasting the failed state index of the Sudan using the four identified indicators.
indicators Two types of
nodes were “absorbed” to simplify the model. The first is nodes that will not inform the
hypothesis. For example, we are not using the “political factors” branch at all. The second type is
intermediate nodes between the question and the hypothesis. These nodes served their purpose in
helping to structure the model and arrive at reasonable initial conditional probabilities. Now they
only add complexity to the final model both computationally, and visually. Notice (compare
Error! Reference source not found.
found.Figure 8 to Error! Reference source not found.Figure
found.
7)
that the absorption process keeps marginal probabilities the same, and introduces new arrows.
We now have a standalone model which can revise the probability of our target node given
beliefs about four key factors. So we could wait for those factors to become known, and update
our estimate four times, as in Error! Reference source not found.
found.Figure 9. But it would be
better if the model could update the FSI continually, as our estimates of the surrounding factors
changed. We can do that by putting all five questions on a live prediction market, and embedding
our model
el as an agent in that market. The model can then update the FSI forecast to match
changing beliefs about the interim factors, even before they resolve.
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Figure 9: Human Development Index

Human Development Index resolves as "Less Than 40", increasing the chance that FSI resolves “Above 100”.

Figure 10: DAGGRE Participant Interface

Prediction Markets in Intelligence Analysis
Prediction markets are ann increasingly well-known
known approach for arriving at probability estimates
for forecasting uncertain events.10 From 2011 to 2013, we ran a prediction
on market called
DAGGRE market as part of a geopolitical forecasting research project sponsored by IARPA, the
Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity. DAGGRE stands for Decomposition Based
10

Yiling Chen and David M Pennock, “Designing Markets for Prediction,” AI Magazine 31:4 (January 13, 2011):
42–52;; M. A. Chinn and L. A. Huffman, Prediction Markets: A Review with an Experimentally Based
Recommendation for Navy Force-shaping
shaping Application (DTIC Document, 2009), available at:
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&id
http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA514204;; Bill Gates et al.,
Prediction Markets for Defense Acquisition: The Devil Is in the Details, May 2010; R. Hanson, “Logarithmic
Market Scoring Rules for Modular Combinatorial Information Aggregation,” The Journal of Prediction Markets 1:1
(2007): 3–15;
15; Justin Wolfers, Eric Zitzewitz, and National Bureau of Economic Research, Prediction Markets in
Theory and Practice (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006).
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Aggregation. All prediction markets aggregate opinions on individual questions; DAGGRE
allows questions to be related. This approach matches nicely with the indicators and measures
approach used in the CAST model.
Error! Reference source not found.Figure 10 shows a screenshot of the participant interface
for the DAGGRE market. The controls inside the ellipse display the current probability of an
outcome and allow the forecaster to adjust the probability up or down. When a participant moves
the probability they are wagering points against the outcome of the event. The size of the wager
and the payout are determined using a logarithmic scoring rule, which has several nice
properties, especially encouraging participants to provide forecasts that are consistent with their
beliefs (it is a “proper” scoring rule).11 This is similar to the approach used to evaluate the
performance of weather forecasters. Additionally, the approach provides successful forecasters
with supplemental resources, in the form of points won, to increase their participation in the
market: over time, the best forecasters get the most influence.
Well-formed questions in prediction markets and variables in Bayes Nets have some similar
characteristics that allow them to complement each other nicely. In both cases the questions
should pass a clarity test.12 That is, the outcome of an event is unequivocally observable as
having occurred or not. This requirement for precision and accuracy separates this approach from
most geopolitical forecasting methods. For example, common forecasts like “Refugees will be a
continued issue in Country X” do not pass the clarity test. We need questions like, “Will the
January Refugee Report issued by the UN High Commissioner on Refugees indicate that the
number of refugees leaving Country X exceeds Y people?” We may care more about whether
refugees are “an issue” than about the number on one report, but if we are to evaluate and
improve our forecasts, we have to cash out “an issue” in terms of measurable indicators. Only
then can we integrate multiple variables into a broader model or to arrive at an unambiguous
description of a complex forecasting situation.
The two approaches can be combined by making specific, measurable questions serve as
indicators for the more complex hypothesis. This is especially powerful if the indicators will
resolve sooner than the hypothesis. In this paper, we use the FSI as the focus hypothesis so that it
too can be on the prediction market, but the technique could apply more generally to provide
early indicators and warnings for a fuzzier but more interesting core hypothesis.

11

Hanson, “Logarithmic Market Scoring Rules for Modular Combinatorial Information Aggregation.”
Howard, R.A. and Matheson, J., The Principles and Application of Decision Analysis, Strategic Decisions Group,
Menlo Park, (1984).

12
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Figure 11: Soft Evidence Affecting the Refugee Count

It remains to show how to update model probabilities from the market before the intermediate
questions resolve,, using the market probabilities as “soft” evidence. For example, let’s assume
that the Human Development Index question is resolved as in Error! Referencee source not
found.Figure 11. This stimulates a forecaster to do some additional thinking and research
concerning refugees leaving Sudan and she concludes that it is 90 ppercent
ercent likely that this
question will resolve as more than 501,000 refugees departing the country. She modifies the
DAGGRE probabilities as shown in Error! Reference source not found.Figure
Figure 10 and the
system in turn reports those probabilities to the Bayes Net. Error! Reference source not
found.Figure 11demonstrates
demonstrates that using Bayes Rule to update the network we see that the
calculated probability for that node is now over 93 percen
percentt and the probability that the Failed
State Index
ndex will be over 100 is increased to 95 percent. It is important to note that the impact on
the probabilities is not linear and is sometimes co
counterintuitive. These unexpected results are
among the most powerful these types of models can provide. That is because the behavior of the
model is largely a function of the local judgments the analyst provided at the time the model was
constructed. The combination of “local judgments” in the computational model is very often
more reliable than a holistic judgment made by an analyst or forecaster.
Another possible use of the Bayes Net, not demonstrated in this paper, is to integrate evidence
from other sources
urces into the Bayes Net as a complement to the values provided by the market.
Using these techniques an updated probability perhaps based on reliable classified information
could be entered into the model without compromising sources and methods. The model
mode could
then interact with either the market or the forecasters as previously described.

Autotraders – A Method for Improving Forecasting
On the combinatorial prediction market, we also introduced aan autotrader that used the Bayes net
values over time and traded in the market alongside human participants. The
he purpose of this was
to improve the forecasting accuracy based on the new evidence that comes with respect to the
questions in the model as well as the prob
probabilistic
abilistic coherence the Bayes Net provides.
provides
The Bayes Net autotrader is an algorithm that trades on the targeted question (“Will Sudan score
less than 100 in the Failed States Index?”) by reading into the Bayes net the information from the
48
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other Sudan questions on the market. The Bayes Net autotrader updates the model with the
market’s best estimate, and then updates the market to keep it consistent with the model.
In the case of Sudan, the offline Bayes Net model originally predicted only a 10 percent chance
for the FSI index to drop below 100, and it became even more confident (5 percent chance) as
some of the supporting nodes/questions resolved.
At the cut-off time of the analysis, the DAGGRE market predicted 8 percent for the Sudan FSI to
drop below 100, and the Bayes Net autotrader (the “online model”) predicted 7 percent. The BN
autotrader trades once per day for a maximum change of 3 percentage points, so the market
substantially agrees with the model.
The users edited this question 321 times and the autotrader edited it ninety-nine times. This
means that the autotrader is responsible for 30 percent of the forecasting activity on this question,
the rest remaining to the human users. On another hand, the human users used the combinatorial
features/ assumptions only twenty-six times (in only 12 percent of the human edits and only 8
percent of the time for the entire activity on this question). The current version of the autotrader
does not directly edit the conditional probabilities on the market, but as described above, it uses
its own conditional probabilities to keep the related market questions consistent.
Besides the market activity and the frequency of edits, we are also looking at the forecasting
accuracy, particularly the Brier score, in order to assess the performance of the market, the
offline model and the autotrader.13 Since the question is still live on the market, we look at the
Brier score in two cases – that the question resolves as False (final probability 0 percent) and that
the question resolves as True (final probability 100 percent). The Brier score is a distance
ranging from zero to two. The closer the Brier score is to zero, the better the forecasting
accuracy.
DAGGRE is evaluated on the average Brier score over time for the life of the question, so
effectively the average Brier score for Error! Reference source not found.Figure 4. The
average Brier score of the combinatorial prediction market for this question (2013 Sudan FSI)
would be 0.035 if the question closes with “No” and 0.774 if it closes with “Yes”. The autotrader
would score 0.035 for the “No” option and 0.807 for the “Yes” option. This means that the
autotrader only slightly worsens the forecasts if the question closes with “Yes” (basically with a
surprise outcome). This is expected, since the online model and the market have been moving in
similar directions and the auatotrader is constrained in the size trade it is allowed to execute.
On another hand, the offline model, in the absence of any information from the market, would
close with a Brier score of 0.0058 for the “No” option and a score of 0.86 for the “Yes” option.
This means that the offline model would perform really well in one case and really bad in the
other.
We can conclude though that over the lifetime of the question, the human traders have largely
agreed with the model, but tempered its forecasts. If we repeated this trial on dozens of
questions, the market (and especially the humans in it) would perform better than the model (and
autotrader) for surprises, and earn points at the autotrader’s expense. But it is also known that in
13

Brier, G., "Verification of forecasts expressed in terms of probability". Monthly weather review 78 (1950): 1–3
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many cases humans update their beliefs too slowly. If the conditional probabilities in the model
are correct, then it is merely pushing the humans to be consistent, and over many questions
should gain relative to them. Over time, the influence in the market will reach equilibrium
between the automated and human traders, with each having the appropriate influence to create
the most accurate forecasts.

Conclusion
The model demonstrated here and the associated research to date reinforces our belief in the
potential of the DAGGRE, decomposition based approach to forecasting, especially when the
market is coupled with Bayesian Networks for medium to long term forecasts of complex
situations. We have demonstrated that the technology is computationally efficient, that Bayesian
Network models can be constructed and integrated into the market with reasonable amounts of
effort. Moreover the evidence to date on forecasting performance, while not conclusive, is very
promising.
Future research is required to confirm or refute our beliefs about improved forecasting
performance to be gained by integrating Bayesian networks and conditional prediction markets.
Additionally, research on how other sources of information can be integrated into the market as
well as how to efficiently update the conditional probability distributions in the model appears
warranted to assess their potential.
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